ناتوانی احتمال‌گرایی در پاسخ به «ایراد وُلتِر»

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17-Psillos, S. (2002) “Simply the Best: A Case for Abduction”, in A. C. Kakas & F. Sadri (Eds.) Computational Logic: Logic Programming and Beyond, Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, Lecture  Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2408, pp. 605–625.

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25-Walker, D. (2012) “A Kuhnian Defence of Inference to the Best Explanation”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science,43: 64-73.